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In Line of Battle
The outbreak of the Spanish-American War 
found the Ericsson attached to the Atlantic fleet, a 
heterogeneous collection of more or less anti­
quated war vessels, including battleships, moni­
tors, cruisers, and gunboats, in addition to the 
“Torpedo Flotilla Among this later class were 
the Du Pont, Porter, Rodgers, Foote, Winslow, 
Cushing, and the Ericsson, all of modern construc­
tion, fast and formidable; and the Gwin, McKee, 
and Talbot, which were small second-class boats.
These torpedo-boats proved seaworthy craft, 
fulfilling their respective roles creditably. The 
Porter, for example, won distinction on a long voy­
age with the fleet to San Juan. One of the “best 
of the boats was the Ericsson, which was almost 
the oldest ”. Having arrived at the New York 
Navy Yards on June 19, 1896, for completion and 
equipment which, in spite of all possible haste, re­
quired a period of eight months, she was placed 
in commission on February 18, 1897, Lieutenant 
Nathaniel Reilly Usher commanding. Her first 
battery consisted of three eighteen-inch White- 
head torpedo tubes, and four one-pound rapid-fire 
guns. The total cost of construction at the time
196
IN  L IN E  O F B A T T L E 197
of commission amounted to $144,142.08. Then 
followed a period of organization and training of 
the crew, and from July 7, 1897, to February 3, 
1898, she cruised leisurely up and down along the 
coast of the United States from Boston, Massa­
chusetts, to Mobile, Alabama. During February, 
March, and most of April, 1898, she was stationed 
at or about Key West, Florida.
Immediately following the ultimatum issued on 
April 20, 1898, by our government to Spain, the 
fleet was concentrated at Key West and ordered 
to blockade Havana and other Cuban ports. In 
these maneuvers the Ericsson took an active part 
from April 22nd to June 1st. She is a long, lean, 
cigar-shaped craft, wrote a reporter concerning 
the Ericsson, “with lines as fine and as gently 
curved as ever beautified a vessel. Forward she 
looks the racer she undoubtedly is, with a long 
rangy bow providing both the buoyancy and reach 
and yet offering the slightest friction as she passes 
through the water. Aft she is gull-like and spare, 
carrying no material not absolutely necessary to 
carry her machinery and retain her symmetry of 
form.’’
But patrol, blockade, and messenger duty was 
the most dangerous service afloat and the most 
uncomfortable work in the whole navy. The 
cramped quarters and the violent pitching of the
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boat made life disagreeable for the crew. The lit­
tle torpedo-boat, never intended for navigating 
heavy seas, crossed and recrossed the treacherous 
passage between Key West and Cuba. Her “low 
free-board” meant that the men on deck were wet 
to the skin before the boat had passed the flagship 
on the way to patrol duty. An officer on the Cush­
ing was washed overboard and lost. The brass 
buttons on the uniforms of the topedo-boat crews, 
turned green by the sea water, became badges of 
high courage and honor.
On the twenty-ninth of April, Admiral Cervera 
left the Cape Verde Islands, in command of a 
Spanish squadron consisting of four armored 
cruisers and three torpedo-boat destroyers, the 
newest and most feared type of war vessels. This 
movement on the part of the enemy created grave 
anxiety all along the eastern seaboard, as nobody 
in America knew whether Cervera was headed 
for Cuba or intended to surprise and bombard 
some important Atlantic seaport, few of which 
were adequately fortified.
The plan of naval strategy adopted for defense 
against this double threat was to divide the North 
Atlantic Fleet into three sections — the blockad­
ing squadron which was later known as the North 
Atlantic Squadron, the Northern Patrol Squad­
ron, and the Flying Squadron. The latter, under
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the command of Commodore W. S. Schley, was 
stationed at Hampton Roads to patrol the Atlan­
tic Coast, ready to ward off any threatened at­
tempt upon the seaboard cities. It was to the 
blockading portion of the fleet that the Ericsson 
was first assigned. This squadron, under the di­
rect command of Admiral W. T. Sampson, was to 
cut off communication with Cuba and cruise the 
Caribbean Sea in the hope of encountering or dis­
covering Cervera’s fleet on its way westward.
For two weeks no one knew where the enemy 
was, although rumors were current and general 
apprehension prevailed. The navy strategists, 
however, were reasonably confident that Cervera 
would have to touch at some West Indian port for 
coal, probably San Juan, Porto Rico, before mak­
ing any offensive movement. But as late as May 
12th he had not reached San Juan and Sampson, 
after rather aimlessly bombarding the fortifica­
tions at that strategic point, turned westward on 
the assumption that the Spaniards were heading 
for some other port. As a matter of fact Cervera 
reached Martinique, less than five hundred miles 
away, that very day. Forty-eight hours later he 
was reported at Curacao, and the whole Atlantic 
fleet was ordered to concentrate at Key West. 
Schley’s Flying Squadron steamed south and ar-
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rived on May 18th, several hours ahead of Samp­
son’s squadron.
It was anticipated that Cervera had orders to 
cooperate with the Spanish army in Cuba and 
would therefore attempt to reach Havana, or some 
port on the south side of the island connected with 
the capital by rail. Admiral Sampson chose to 
patrol the north coast of Cuba, in order to inter­
cept the Spanish fleet if it tried to reach Havana 
by way of the Windward Passage. Commodore 
Schley was ordered to proceed around the west­
ern end of Cuba through the Yucatan Channel to 
Cienfuegos in anticipation of meeting the enemy, 
finding him at Cienfuegos which was his most 
likely destination, or waiting for him there. Start­
ing with the Brooklyn, Massachusetts, Texas, and 
Scorpion, he was joined within the next two days 
by the Iowa, Marblehead, and the collier Merri- 
mac. Without encountering any signs of the 
enemy, Schley arrived before Cienfuegos on May 
21st and established a blockade. The Ericsson 
was left behind at Key West.
Santiago, on the southeastern coast of Cuba, 
also offered an alternative port of refuge for the 
Spanish fleet, but since this place was then cut off 
from General Blanco s army, it did not seem like­
ly that Admiral Cervera would go there. Being 
short of coal, however, and unable to obtain a sat-
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isfactory supply at Curacao, Cervera determined 
to touch at Santiago, hoping that he might be able 
to refuel and slip out again before being discov­
ered by the Americans. Shortly after daybreak 
on May 19th, lookouts stationed on the Morro (a 
fortified hill) guarding the entrance to the harbor 
at Santiago de Cuba sighted the vessels of the 
Spanish squadron. The entire fleet, short of ra­
tions, coal, and water and manned by a crew whose 
morale was at a very low ebb, slipped haltingly 
into the harbor under the protection of the fort­
ress, whose garrison, themselves illy supplied with 
provisions of any kind, was in poor position to suc­
cor their almost destitute comrades. If his force 
had been in better condition, Cervera might have 
reached Cienfuegos before Schley and established 
contact with the army.
Meanwhile the Navy Department notified 
Sampson that spies had reported the presence of 
the Spanish fleet at Santiago and suggested that 
he order Schley to that port. But Sampson hesi­
tated. When Schley finally reached the vicinity 
of Santiago, a scout cruiser told him that nothing 
positive was known about the Spaniards, where­
upon he headed back around Cuba bound for Key 
West! Two days later, however, he reversed his 
course and returned to Santiago. It was not un­
til the end of May that the American naval forces
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were concentrated before the harbor of Santiago 
and established a close blockade. Cervera’s fleet 
was effectively shut in, unable to escape or to fight 
advantageously.
In the meantime, about the first of June, the 
Ericsson was assigned to duty as a convoy to the 
transports bearing General W. R. Shatters 
troops from Tampa, Florida, across the channel 
to Cuba. This duty having been successfully dis­
charged, she, together with other vessels, was 
transferred to duty with Admiral Sampson s 
squadron at Santiago. The blockade proved to be 
a monotonous task. For several weeks the Span­
iards made no apparent effort either to attack or 
escape. One episode, however, enlivened the sit­
uation, when Lieutenant R. P. Hobson made a 
gallant though unsuccessful attempt to bottle the 
enemy’s fleet in the harbor by sinking the disabled 
collier Merrimac across the mouth of the channel.
And so the blockade wore on throughout the 
month of June. The duties of various members of 
the fleet became perfunctory and routine. Early 
on Sunday morning, July 3rd, the Massachusetts 
left her station with the fleet, and headed for 
Guantanamo to coal. The morning routine was in 
progress. The engineers were utilizing the re­
spite of daylight for overhauling their machinery 
and cleaning the boiler tubes. At about nine
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o’clock the flagship New York left the line, ac­
companied by the Ericsson, and proceeded slowly 
down the coast towards Siboney, east of Santiago, 
where Admiral Sampson was to land for the pur­
pose of conferring with General Shafter on the 
best measures to be adopted for the relief of the 
hard-pressed expeditionary forces.
On the preceding evening six columns of smoke 
had been noticed above the hills, far back in the 
land-locked harbor. As this had occurred before, 
it aroused no undue anxiety. Nevertheless the 
lookouts on the Iowa, stationed directly opposite 
the mouth of the harbor, were on the alert. About 
the time the New York left her position, a sailor 
on the Iowa observed smoke moving toward the 
mouth of the harbor, and at 9:15 called the atten­
tion of several officers to it. Eager eyes soon con­
firmed their suspicions, whereupon the Iowa fired 
the alarm gun and hoisted signal No. 250, “the 
enemy’s ships are escaping.” This was about 
9:30. As quickly as possible the blockading fleet 
closed in, according to the prearranged plan. The 
New York heard the signal and returned to the 
fight, though too late to take a prominent part. 
Cervera’s flagship, the Maria Teresa, first 
emerged from the mouth of the harbor and headed 
west along the shore, followed immediately by the 
Vizcaya, Cristobal Colon, Almirante Oquendo,
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and finally the dreaded destroyers, Pluton and 
Furor.
The details of the remarkable battle which en­
sued are well known. One by one the great ships 
of the Spanish squadron steamed out of the har­
bor and ran the gauntlet of American fire. The 
Teresa, having faced the first attack, was soon 
ablaze and had to be beached about six miles 
west of the Morro. Ten minutes later the 
Oquendo met a similar fate. The Indiana and the 
Gloucester pounced upon the destroyers so furi­
ously that the Furor was sunk and the Pluton was 
run ashore almost immediately. On down the 
coast fled the Vizcaya and the Colon, trying to 
outdistance their pursuers. The Indiana dropped 
behind, and the Iowa was ordered back to guard 
the transports, but the Brooklyn, Oregon, and 
Texas kept up the chase. At eleven o’clock the 
Vizcaya turned ashore about fifteen miles from 
the Morro, and two hours later the Colon surren­
dered thirty miles farther west. Not a single 
vessel escaped.
Fate prevented the Ericsson from distinguish­
ing herself as the engine of destruction she was 
reputed to be. By the time she arrived upon the 
scene, the major part of the engagement was over.
As the New York and the Ericsson passed the 
mouth of the harbor, however, the shore batteries,
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which had previously been directing their fire on 
the Gloucester, turned to them as better targets. 
Though both vessels were going at full speed as 
they drew near the entrance, the guns of the Mor- 
ro almost got their range. “Several shells struck 
near us, short or beyond, and two burst overhead 
and over.” The Ericsson was not struck, how­
ever.
When the Vizcaya “struck her flag”, the Erics­
son was close astern of her, preparing to launch a 
Whitehead torpedo. It is to the credit of the gun­
ner and her commanding officer, Lieutenant Ush­
er, that the death-dealing missile remained undis­
charged, thus sparing many lives. Instead, she 
drew off and headed after the Colon.
Lieutenant Usher’s report of the battle to the 
commanding officer of the fleet on July 5th best 
describes what followed. “As the Ericsson was 
hauling away from the New York in the chase, 
signal was made, interrogatory, No. 2872, Re­
quest permission to continue the chase.’ The 
flagship hoisted negative and by wigwag signal 
directed the Ericsson to pick up men in the water 
astern. Turned with port helm and found and 
picked up one man afloat on a piece of wreckage, 
and then returned to the chase, and New York in 
the meantime chasing fast after the Colon. As 
we came up with the Iowa, lying about 2 miles
IN  L IN E  O F B A T T L E 207
seaward of Vizcaya, the Ericsson was hailed and 
directed to go inshore and rescue the crew of the 
Vizcaya from the burning vessel. Ran close 
alongside the Vizcaya and sent small boat to her, 
boats from Iowa pulling in also at same time. Ex­
plosions from the ammunition on board the Viz~ 
caya began about this time and her guns, which 
had been left loaded, were fired one after the oth­
er by the flames. The Vizcaya was on fire fore 
and aft, but the mass of the fire was aft, and the 
position of the Ericsson was perilous in the ex­
treme and only the urgency of the occasion caused 
her to remain. Rescued 11 officers and about 90 
sailors and marines from the vessel, many of them 
sorely wounded. The Spanish were no sooner 
taken on board than they urged immediate with­
drawal of the Ericsson, but this vessel remained 
until all alive had been taken from the Vizcaya by 
the Ericsson s small boat and the boats from the 
Iowa. One of the Vizcaya s large cutters was al­
so used. The Ericsson s deck was then crowded 
with prisoners, most of them naked and many of 
them wounded, and she returned to the Iowa, tow­
ing the Vizcaya’s cutter, also filled with prisoners. 
These were all put on board the Iowa, and the 
Ericsson was by her directed to verify the infor­
mation given by the Resolute, which came up from 
eastward, and signaled, ‘Enemy’s ships to east-
208 T H E  PA LIM P S E S T
ward’. Spoke Resolute, which reported that she 
had made out an enemy’s battle ship off Siboney; 
then spoke transport Comal, which had only seen 
the signal displayed by the Resolute', then spoke 
Harvard, which reported having made out an 
enemy’s battle ship; requested Harvard to notify 
Iowa, and proceeded under full speed to eastward. 
Off vicinity of Siboney sighted Indiana and an 
Austrian battleship. The Indiana signaled Erics­
son to come within hail, and directed that we pro­
ceed under full speed to westward to notify our 
vessels of presence of Austrian battleship Infanta 
Maria Theresa, which, desiring to go into Santi­
ago, had been referred to the commander-in-chief 
in view of the existing conditions. Proceeded as 
directed until up with Iowa; reported to Iowa, and 
that our coal was almost gone, and that we were 
using salt feed in the boilers, the vessel only carry­
ing two hours’ fresh feed at full power, and the 
Ericsson then having been over four hours under 
full power. Received permission to return to east­
ward, and proceeded until signaled by Harvard 
to come within hail; by her was directed to tow 
her boats to and from the burning wrecks of the 
Maria Teresa and Oquendo. This was accord­
ingly done until no more persons remained to be 
rescued from the vessels, the remaining prisoners 
being all ashore on the beach. Received permis-
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sion from the Harvard to proceed to eastward. 
About 6 p. m. spoke Iowa, and received permis­
sion to go to Guantanamo for coal and water, at 
which harbor Ericsson arrived at 9:45 p. m., and 
reported the victory to commanding officer U. S. 
S. Massachusetts, the senior officer present.
“There were no casualties on board this vessel.’
Thus in the course of a few hours came and 
passed the climax in the career of the Ericsson, 
one of the best, most popular, and most feared 
vessels of her class in the entire navy. Singular­
ly, fate decreed that she should never discharge a 
single torpedo at an enemy’s ship or destroy a hu­
man life. On the contrary, this vessel, though po­
tentially a dreaded engine of destruction, actually 
became an apostle of mercy, saving many lives by 
the dauntless courage of her crew and her ability, 
on account of her shallow draught, to run in close 
to shore where larger vessels dared not go.
The Ericsson remained in Cuban waters until 
August 10, 1898, assisting in the blockade of Cu­
ban ports, when she set sail for the United States, 
arriving at New York harbor on August 23rd. 
Meanwhile, peace having been reestablished, she 
was placed out of commission on September 21st, 
and was so disposed throughout the years 1899 
and 1900. In 1901 she was entered upon reserve 
at the Norfolk Navy Yard, and attached to the
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‘reserve torpedo flotilla until 1908. In 1909 she 
was transferred and remained on reserve at the 
Charleston Navy Yard until 1912, when on April 
5th she was placed out of commission, being 
stricken from the navy list on the following day, 
April 6, 1912.
Some time subsequently the Ericsson was em­
ployed as a target for practice of the fleet. Al­
though available records do not disclose the date 
or place of her demise, she now lies somewhere 
at the bottom of the Atlantic.
Ben H ur W ilson
